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A B S T R A C T   
The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) stated that the world has two coexisting di-
mensions: the Will-side, which is the metaphysical, ideal, and ultimate reality where isolated creatures do not 
exist; and the Representational side, which Will-powered, self-centered individual phenomenon inhabits. 
Schopenhauer asserted that in human societies under the imperative of the Will, temporal justice may only aspire 
to prevent ill-natured actions towards humans and animals. Absolute freedom happens at the metaphysical level 
of the primeval Will, and an eternal justice exists, because victims and perpetrators belong to the same essence, 
and their deeds are therefore balanced. In Schopenhauerian terms, the only bridge between temporal and eternal 
justice is Will-denial, which leads to compassion and asceticism, and occurs after the awareness of the unity of all 
living beings. However, Will-denial, by being a strictly individual and unpredictable issue, led to Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism about an enduring collective well-being. Approaching eternal and temporal justices is thus, a worthy 
quest, which is visible in the current worldwide concern and interest in altruism, cooperation, and compassion. 
Nevertheless, if this progress is devoid of compassion and asceticism (cooperation and healthy austerity in 
modern terms) it could lead to increased malicious social control and manipulation. Schopenhauer’s thought 
may thus be part of the philosophical foundations of contemporary forensic psychiatry. This paper discusses 
these aspects of the philosopher’s work, with reference to current ideas and literature in forensic psychiatry, 
psychology, law, and issues in contemporary physics which are pertinent to this debate.   
1. Introduction: Why Arthur Schopenhauer? 
Arthur Schopenhauer was born in Danzig, now Poland in 1788 and 
died in Frankfurt, Germany in 1860. He obtained his doctorate in phi-
losophy in the University of Jena in 1813 and after a failed career as a 
university professor, spent his life working out of the professional 
academy. Schopenhauer wrote with a clear, critical, and ironic prose; 
while he was pessimistic about a durable collective well-being, he 
developed a path to individual salvation by means of compassion and 
asceticism. 
Schopenhauer further developed and applied Immanuel Kant’s 
representational model of the mind,1 which is a core issue in current 
cognitive neuroscience (Hepp, 2020), and searched for a general, 
non-theistic, naturalistic principle (metaphysics) underlying the whole 
universe including living creatures and humans, which he named as the 
“Will” (Schopenhauer, 1907, 2010a). 
Schopenhauer was widely read in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury, but thereafter was relatively overlooked until the last three decades 
which have witnessed a growing interest in his work (Schopenhauer, 
2010a, Introduction on p. viii). For instance, his thought was the subject 
of at least three popular novels (Houellebecq, 1998, 2005; Yalom, 
2005). Further, two academic journals devoted to his work were 
recently launched, one in Brazil (Voluntas, https://periodicos.ufsm.br 
/voluntas) and the other in Spain (Schopenhaueriana, http 
s://sociedadschopenhauer.com/acerca-de/). Novel, authoritative 
translations of his works have been carried out (Schopenhauer, 2010a, 
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1 Inmanuel Kant (1724–1804) is a central figure of the Transcendental Idealism school. He postulated that our experience is ineluctably structured by our cognitive 
faculties, and it puts an epistemic barrier between ourselves and the world as it is-in-itself. According to Kant, we perceive objects in space and time, but these are 
dimensions that are imposed a priori (before experience) by our intellect. Accordingly, we do not know things as they really are (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
kant-transcendental-idealism/downloaded in June 2021). The notion of the thing-in-themselves is a key issue in metaphysical reasoning, which tends to be of little 
use in contemporary epistemology (Stern, 2020). 
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2012, 2015, 2016, 2018) and a comprehensive Handbook about his 
thought was recently released (Wicks, 2020). 
Schopenhauer influenced many fields of knowledge: philosophy, 
literature, art -particularly music-, religion, psychology, biology, mo-
rality, justice and notably ethics (Young, 2005). He is popularly 
described as the “pessimist philosopher” and the “psychologist of the 
will” (Thomas Moore cited by Ivars, 1976). His thought is fervently 
praised or criticized. For instance, Jorge Luis Borges (1899–1986) 
thanked Schopenhauer “who perhaps deciphered the universe” (Borges, 
2016). By contrast, the Spanish philosopher Julián Marías Aguilera 
(1914–2005) stated that “Schopenhauer’s metaphysical foundations 
have scarce solidity and his influence led many to be lost in a farrago of 
theosophy, literature and Hinduism, where the meaning of philosophy 
was the actual loser” (Cardona, 1998, our translation). 
On the one hand, Schopenhauer was charged as anti-Semitic 
(Golomb, 2020), misogynic, and devoid of a coherent social project 
(Ivars, 1976), but on the other, he was commended by Max Horkheimer 
(1895–1973) as follows: “Schopenhauer exposes the motive for soli-
darity shared by men and all beings” (cited by Young, 2005). 
Several subjects of the philosopher’s work have been particularly 
explored by contemporary researchers in the mental health field. Con-
cerning psychoanalytic theory, Young proposed that Schopenhauer’s 
construct of the Will (discussed further below) and that of the psycho-
dynamic unconscious mind share their a-rational tendency (Young, 
2005). Additionally, Atzert (2020) suggested an analogy between the 
Schopenhauerian Will-denial and the Freudian drive to death. 
In the medical field, the authors are evaluating how to set a heuristic 
bridge between Schopenhauer’s thought and psychiatry, general and 
evolutionary psychology, and psychotherapy (Baptista, 2016; Baptista 
and Aldana, 2018; Baptista et al., 2018; Baptista et al., 2019; Baptista, 
2020). The core of this project is Schopenhauer’s notion of Will-derived 
self-centeredness, which the authors believe pervades individual and 
social life (discussed further below). With the self-interest construct, 
Schopenhauer described the individual life cycle and social interaction. 
This construct is potentially suitable for psychoeducation and psycho-
therapy with relative independence of the specific psychiatric diagnosis 
(Baptista et al., 2018). 
Regarding social psychology, Maner et al. (2007) explored Scho-
penhauer’s famous parable of the porcupines,2 which according to the 
ironic philosopher’s prose, illustrates social human interaction. These 
authors found that the porcupines’ principle increases the motivation to 
forge social bonds with new sources of potential affiliation. 
As is discussed in this paper, Schopenhauer’s thought may enrich the 
field of contemporary forensic psychiatry with its concern about mo-
rality, ethics, and justice. Specifically, Schopenhauer’s acumens of 
human motivations which depart from self-centeredness, may provide a 
framework for promoting cooperativeness and empathy (Baptista, 2016; 
Baptista et al., 2018). 
Hence, in this article, after briefly reviewing his thought, we will 
describe Schopenhauer’s model of personality development, individual 
freedom, and the propensity to display malice and criminality. Then, we 
will focus on his theory of law and justice, which may have anticipated 
evolutionary-based models of cooperation and deception (Baptista et al., 
2018). For this purpose, we will discuss the work of R.B. Marcin, who 
stated that Schopenhauer’s thought approaches the concepts of 
contemporary quantic physics, which may be relevant for current de-
bates on morals, ethics, justice, and the law (Marcin, 2020). Finally, we 
discuss Schopenhauer’s thought under the light of contemporary science 
and how it may contribute to solving the current puzzles of forensic 
psychiatry. 
Schopenhauer is commended for his original and precise prose. 
Hence, we included numerous literal excerpts of his works, which we 
hope, will enrich this manuscript. 
2. Schopenhauer’s philosophical thought 
Schopenhauer described two sides of the world: one physical, the 
world as Representation or the world as it appears, and the other 
metaphysical, which is the world as it really is: the world as will 
(referred to as Will from now on). With this model, he bridged a gap that 
had long existed between Western and Eastern philosophical thoughts 
(Marcin, 2020). 
2.1. The Will 
For Schopenhauer, the Will is defined as follows: 
The innermost, the kernel of every individual thing and likewise of the 
whole: it appears in every blind operation of a force of nature: it also 
appears in deliberative human action; these differ from each other only in 
the grade of their appearing, not in the essence of what appears (Scho-
penhauer, 2010a, § 2 on p. 135). 
Schopenhauer asserted that, “a Will must also be attributed to all that 
is lifeless and inorganic” (Schopenhauer, 1907, on p. 309), and 
emphasized that the Will “in itself, however, is unconscious, for con-
sciousness is conditioned by the intellect, and the intellect is a mere 
accident of our being” (Schopenhauer, 1909, § 19, on p. 411). 
Hence, for Schopenhauer, the Will is the essence of the universe, the 
source of organic and inorganic beings, and the tendency to exist and/or 
live. The categories of space, time, and causality do not belong to the 
primeval Will. He initially considered the Will as the Kantian thing-in- 
itself (Schopenhauer, 2010a), which is also out of the time, space, in-
dividuality, and causality categories. Later, he posited that since we, 
human beings, know the Will only in relation to the succession of events 
(that is, in time, and, therefore, as a representation), “the act of Will is 
indeed the closest and most distinct manifestation of the thing-in-itself” 
(Schopenhauer, 1909, § 18, on p. 407). 
2.2. Representation 
For the philosopher, representation is knowledge. He asked: “What is 
knowledge?” (cognition): 
It is primarily and essentially idea (emphasis ours and henceforth). What 
is idea? “A very complicated physiological process in the brain of an 
animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a picture there. Clearly 
the relation between such a picture and something entirely different from 
the animal in whose brain it exists can only be a very indirect one. This is 
perhaps the simplest and most comprehensible way of disclosing the deep 
gulf between the ideal and the real” (Schopenhauer, 1909, § 18, on p. 
400). 
Schopenhauer used the term “idea” in the above definition to refer to 
the mental representation of any given object, event, sensation, etc. This 
definition contrasts with the Platonic “Ideas”, that refer to prototypes or 
models, which also are, with some variations, key concepts in Scho-
penhauer’s thought (Marcin, 1994). In contemporary cognitive psy-
chology, the “ideas” may correspond to the product of immediate 
perception and automatic analysis, whereas the “Ideas” may refer to 
unconscious or pre-conscious templates or frameworks with which the 
objects of perception are compared to (Baptista, 2016). 
Therefore, the roots of Schopenhauer’s thought are in the Kantian 
concepts of the thing-in-itself (noumenon) for the Will, and phenomena 
or singularities for the objectivized Will through the act of 
2 A number of porcupines huddled together for warmth on a cold day in winter; 
but, as they began to prick one another with their quills, they were obliged to disperse. 
However, the cold drove them together again, when just the same thing happened … 
In the same way the need of society drives the human porcupines together, only to be 
mutually repelled by the many prickly and disagreeable qualities of their nature 
(Schopenhauer, 2015, § 31). 
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representation. 
2.3. Levels of the Will 
Schopenhauer conceived several dimensions of objectivation (indi-
viduation) of the Will (Schopenhauer, 2010a). Given its metaphysical 
sense, the term “levels” is probably inadequate, and we will use it with 
some caution.  
(a) An unknowable primeval level (the Kantian thing-in-itself).  
(b) The basic forces of nature, some of them omnipresent, such as 
gravity and impenetrability, and others coupled to specific pieces 
of matter, such as rigidity, elasticity, fluidity, electricity, 
magnetism, chemical properties, etc.  
(c) The Platonic Ideas.  
(d) All the inorganic and organic phenomena, and,  
(e) The deliberate human actions as the pinnacle, constituting a 
minute part of the whole Will.3 
The levels or dimensions a-c of the Will are outside space, time, 
causality, and individuality, which are only possible after the “prin-
cipium individuationis” allows the existence of phenomena (see footnote 
n◦ 11). 
Importantly, Schopenhauer stated that we have a privileged access to 
the Will by observing our body, its needs, and desires: 
But since now perception can afford us only phenomena, not things in 
themselves, we have also absolutely no knowledge of things in themselves. 
I grant this of everything with the single exception of the knowledge which 
each of us has of his own willing. We ourselves are the-thing-in-itself 
(Schopenhauer, 1909, § 18, on p. 405). 
Introspection always shows us to ourselves as willing (Schopenhauer, 
1907, § 42, on p.169). 
According to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, the Will is the same all 
throughout the individual life cycle (see 3.3 below). While not explicitly 
pointed out in his texts, one may assume that mental disorders would not 
change the individual Will. But this would not be the case for the 
representational system, which causally depends on the functioning of 
the nervous system. The default hypothesis under Schopenhauer’s 
model would then be that the mentally ill and lawbreakers displays their 
intact Will along with a distorted mechanism of representation (Baptista 
et al., 2018). 
2.4. Levels of representation 
In Schopenhauer’s model, representation (cognition) appears in an-
imals, as follows (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 27, on p. 174–176).  
a) At the inorganic level, the basic forces of nature are guided by causes.  
b) In the next level, plants are guided by stimuli. At (a) and (b) there is 
no cognition in Schopenhauer’s sense.  
c) Since animals must move for feeding and reproduction, their activity 
requires cognition. Hence, according to Schopenhauer, animals are 
guided by motives. By ‘motives’ he meant an object of cognition, an 
occurrent perception that is the material of the act of Will, in the 
sense that the act of Will is directed towards it (Schopenhauer, 
2010b).4 
d) Humans are guided by abstract motives, as expressed in Scho-
penhauer’s own words: 
Finally, where the will has achieved the highest degree of objectivation, the 
cognition from the understanding that arises in animals, and that the 
senses supply with data, and from which arise mere intuitions that are tied 
to the present – this cognition is no longer sufficient. The complicated, 
multifaceted, malleable, extremely needy being who is exposed to 
countless injuries – the human –had to be illuminated by a twofold 
cognition in order to exist; a higher potency of intuitive cognition, as it 
were, had to be added, a reflection of that intuitive cognition: reason as 
the faculty of abstract concepts (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 27, on p. 
176). 
This way, Schopenhauer organized the dynamics of the Will’s ex-
pressions in his concept of causality through the principle of sufficient 
reason (see section 3.1). 
3. Schopenhauer’s model of the mind, personality, and behavior 
3.1. The mind 
Schopenhauer simplified Kant’s apparatus of the faculty of cognition 
into the following components: a) the senses, which organize succession 
and position as the fundamental notions of time and space, respectively; 
b) the understanding, which provides the conception of causality, and c) 
reason, which allows concepts, that is, the maximal cognitive human 
capacity (Schopenhauer, 2010). It is worth noting that the brain frontal 
lobe plays critical roles in concepts’ development and their integration 
into cognitive emotional and behavioral responses. Convergent evidence 
points to frontal and prefrontal lobe dysfunctions in subjects with vio-
lent and criminal behaviors, and in those with severe mental disorders 
(Brower & Price, 2001). 
Besides, Schopenhauer aimed at improving the foundations of the 
long-existing principle of sufficient reason which states that “everything 
must have a reason, cause, or ground” (Schopenhauer, 1907; Wicks 
2021).5 For the philosopher, the four roots of the principle of sufficient 
reason are becoming (causality), cognition (logic), being (existence in 
space and time), and acting (moral and ethical issues) (Schopenhauer, 
1907). He asserted that much philosophical confusion arises from at-
tempts to explain objects of one kind by reasoning that belongs to the 
other kind. 
Wittgenstein notably criticized the whole structure of Scho-
penhauer’s formulation (Phillips-Griffiths, 1976). However, the princi-
ple of sufficient reason expressed in diverse forms is an important tool in 
contemporary thinking. In the psychiatric field, violations of the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason are implicit in the cognitive distortions 
observed in depression, anxiety, obsessive compulsive- and paranoid 
disorders. Under the effects of these distortions, the subjects confuse 
different levels and categories of explanations of their personal affairs, 
for example thoughts and/or emotions with actions and their 
3 This is a core issue in Schopenhauer’s thought, since in his model of mind, 
the Will, as motivational force behind behavior is mainly a simple, unconscious, 
and blind impulse. This concept is far from the usual conception of Will, which 
is reflective and directed toward concrete goals. 
4 The term “motive” along with that of “representation” are commonly used 
in contemporary psychology. Motivation refers to a cognitive elaboration of 
more basic drives, instincts and other external or internal sources of arousal. An 
important area of research is how motivational pressures differ among healthy 
people, the mentally ill and those involved in criminal behaviors (Davison & 
Janca, 2012; Dweck, 2017.  
5 While this principle was implicit in the writings of several pre-Socratic 
thinkers, Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1646–1716) set the basis upon which Schopenhauer extended the discussion 
about causality in all his forms. Importantly, in contemporary epistemology, 
distinctions are made between causality and groundings. 
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consequences (Robbins et al., 2019). 
While Kant argued that animals, being devoid of conceptual abilities, 
cannot have a full experience of the world of objects, Schopenhauer 
stated that they can indeed, but only in their present perception 
(Schopenhauer, 2010a, b). This is an important issue, where Scho-
penhauer differs from Kant. The latter, famously stated, “thoughts 
without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (htt 
ps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-judgment/supplement1.html, 
downloaded in July 2021). Schopenhauer adheres to the first clause but 
holds that there is indeed what today philosophers might call 
“non-conceptual content,” and what he referred to as “intuitive cogni-
tion”, “knowledge of perception” or “feeling”. This cognition allows 
human and many non-human animals to navigate and operate in the 
world, largely without concepts. Furthermore, for Schopenhauer, this is 
the kind of knowledge we gain, par excellence, through aesthetic ex-
periences of nature and art; but this knowledge is not, or at least not-yet, 
conceptual, though it is a knowledge of the “Platonic Ideas” or essential 
features of the phenomenal world (Schopenhauer, 2010a, b; Shapshay, 
2021). 
Intuitive cognition as non-conceptual knowledge and the highly 
conceptual human reason arguably anticipated the contemporary terms 
of “cognitive and meta-cognitive” processes. The former refers to auto-
matic information processing mostly unconscious, whereas the later 
refers to thinking or reflecting about our own mental activity (Flavell, 
1999). This dual information-processing model sets the basis for 
contemporary psychotherapy, where the subject heuristically ponders 
his automatic -but still cognitively meaningful-responses ((Robbins, 
Vaghi, & Banca). This analysis may surely exclude pure automatisms 
often linked to brain dysfunction or involuntary intoxication, which 
implies a severe impairment of conscience, hence, a minimal cognitive 
processing. Alleging automatisms may be used as a defense for criminal 
charges (Yeo, 2002). 
Importantly, Schopenhauer considered the complex and elaborated 
faculties of intellect and reason as completely subordinated to the rather 
simple Will, as he illustrated: 
The will alone is everywhere completely itself. For its function is of the 
utmost simplicity; it consists in willing and not willing, which goes on with 
the greatest ease, without effort, and requires no practice. Knowing, on the 
contrary, has multifarious functions, and never takes place entirely 
without effort, which is required to fix the attention and to make clear the 
object, and at a higher stage is certainly needed for thinking and delib-
eration (Schopenhauer, 1909, § 19, on p. 419). 
3.2. The personality 
Schopenhauer indistinctly used the terms ‘personality’ and ‘char-
acter’. Based on Kant, he described three dimensions of character 
(Schopenhauer, 2010a, b). 
a) The intelligible character is the Will as thing-in-itself so far as it ap-
pears in a definite individual in a definite grade, outside time, and 
therefore indivisible and unchangeable.  
b) The empirical character, also unchangeable, is named that way 
because one does not know it a priori (before) but a posteriori (after) 
by observing one’s own behavior along time.  
c) The acquired character refers to the insight one develops by 
observing one’s empirical character along time.6 This self-knowledge 
may change behavior by modifying the motives that the Will pursues. 
Since the Will is the foundation of the intelligible character, the 
question arises as to whether the Will is similar in all human beings. 
Schopenhauer stated that there are no differences in the degrees of 
Will’s nature among individuals; the differences pertain to the Will’s 
excitability. This might partially explain the notion of personality types 
in Schopenhauer thought (see section 3.3). However, within a person 
life’s span, the Will does not change: 
The will never tires, never grows old, never learns, never improves by 
practice, is in infancy what it is in old age, eternally one and the same and 
its character in each individual is unchangeable (Schopenhauer, 1907, §
2, on p. 247). 
In agreement with the notion of the acquired character, recent 
research has shown that the asymmetries in the global structure of 
personality traits such as those described as the “Big Five Personality 
Factors” tend to balance with age. Specifically, neuroticism and impul-
sivity decrease, whereas openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness 
tend to increase (Gerlach et al., 2018). Age-related personality balance 
would thus correlate with decreased criminality, particularly of a violent 
and visible type, irrespective of the offender’s sex. Criminality in people 
after their forties has been less characterized, but they seem to be more 
involved in surreptitious crimes such as embezzlement, stock fraud, 
bribery, or price-fixing. However, significant variations, which predict a 
better adjustment to psychosocial interventions, exist in temperament 
and character dimensions within the same age-group of young de-
linquents. This within age-group variability, along with a significant 
contribution of the social environment, particularly involving the access 
to legal employments and social support, are relevant intervening var-
iables in the age-crime propensity association (Seidl et al., 2020; Shul-
man et al., 2013). 
Schopenhauer conceived the human personality as comprising two 
dimensions: the moral nature, character, or inclinations (the Will), and 
the intellect (the representational dimension). The former dimension 
would be “imparted” by the father and the latter by the mother (Scho-
penhauer, 1909). The issue of intelligence and mother genetic contri-
bution has received some support in contemporary research (Der et al., 
2006; Plomin & Deary, 2015; Sanchez-Roige et al., 2018). 
3.3. Personality types 
Schopenhauer acknowledged the diversity of personality (character) 
types but did not delve deeper on how this occurs. Since the primeval 
Will is one and the same in every person, one wonders where, in the 
process of Will’s display, the diversification in the intelligible (primor-
dial) character might occur. 
The philosopher did not discuss this issue, but he stated that every 
single person is indeed a Platonic Idea. Therefore, one is tempted to 
speculate that within Schopenhauer body of thought, it is at the level of 
the Ideas, that the amorphous Will would reorganize itself as individual 
characters. How Schopenhauer may have anticipated contemporary 
findings in personality developments was not discussed in detail by early 
or recent Schopenhauer’s scholars (Atwell, 1990; Wicks, 2020). 
Importantly, Schopenhauer suggested functional differences at a foun-
dational level in the Will as expressed in humans7: 
The will, as original and the thing in itself, can never be imperfect, but 
every act of will is all that it can be. On account of the simplicity which 
belongs to the will as the thing in itself, the metaphysical in the phe-
nomenon, its nature admits of no degrees, but is always completely itself. 
Only its excitement has degrees, from the weakest inclination to the 
6 Insight or self-awareness, while involving emotions, often requires modi-
fying concepts, that is abstract thinking. Accordingly, insight is often defined as 
cognitive restructuration (Robbins et al., 2019). 
7 It is unclear how foundational differences in the Will may be currently 
interpreted. Contemporary psychology acknowledges differences in individual 
temperament, which is a construct with significant congenital factors. But any 
activity attributed to temperament implies cognitive processing, which is a 
level far distant from the primeval Will in Schopenhauer’s thought. 
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passion, and also its susceptibility to excitement, thus its vehemence from 
the phlegmatic to the choleric temperament (Schopenhauer, 2909, § 19, 
on p. 418). 
3.4. Freedom, behavior, and deeds 
According to Schopenhauer, all human actions proceed with neces-
sity from a combination of their motives and their character (Scho-
penhauer, 2010b). 
Since any human’s decision will depend on the individual’s character 
and the relative weight of a set of motives, Schopenhauer disavowed 
true freedom in human deeds. In fact, the philosopher conferred no 
special ‘dignity’ to reason and its capacity to construct concepts and 
demoted its power as a source of freedom and morality. The philosopher 
asserted that “… a rationally motivated action is not guaranteed to be 
any more morally good -or free-than one otherwise caused” (Scho-
penhauer, 2010b, Introduction, on p. xviii). 
Schopenhauer further stated that: 
Rational and vicious can combine very well, and indeed it is only through 
their combination that great, far-reaching crimes are possible (…) Irra-
tional and noble-minded likewise coexist very well (Schopenhauer, 
2010b, § 6, on p.151). 
Schopenhauer’s wrote this passage when referring to his rejection of 
slavery and of conquers and their wars, as vivid examples of the insa-
tiability of the Will and of human self-centeredness. Schopenhauer did 
not conduct a philosophical analysis of the different types of crime, but 
instead focused on malice and crime in general, as conspicuous mani-
festations of human selfishness. Hence, strictly speaking, his thought did 
not anticipate the contemporary findings of positive correlations be-
tween non-violent crimes such as those of the white-collar type, with 
normal or high intelligence levels (IQ), and the inverse correlation be-
tween the frequency of violent crimes and low IQ. Schopenhauer’s 
writings did not anticipate either the complex interactions between low 
social class, education status, IQ and criminality (Bartels et al., 2010; htt 
ps://www.encyclopedia.com/law/legal-and-political-magazines/intell 
igence-and-crime, downloaded on June 2021). 
Whereas Schopenhauer denied absolute freedom in human acts, he 
asserted that in a metaphysical sense, the Will in-itself at all its levels is 
entirely free, as expressed in an often-quoted sentence: 
I can do what I will (…) But (…) Can you also will what you will? 
(Schopenhauer, 2010b, § 1, on p. 34). 
Importantly, the Will’s denial, which is the crux of Schopenhauer’s 
ethics, is the only free act of the human Will (see section 5). 
Concerning the ontogeny of the ‘evil’ and the ‘good’, Schopenhauer 
granted little influence on education, and rather emphasized the way in 
which the Will showed itself in a particular person: 
Why one person is evil and another good is not a matter of motives or 
external influences (such as education or sermons), and in this sense it is 
strictly inexplicable (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 26, on p. 163).8 
Concerning human motivations, Schopenhauer stated that there are 
three fundamental incentives of human actions: egoism, malice, and 
compassion (Schopenhauer, 2010b). This is a key issue when discussing 
ethics and justice in the philosopher’s system.  
a) Selfishness or egoism is our usual state, since every individual 
struggle for preserving his own body, very often at the expense of 
others. 
b) Malice appears when a person intentionally appropriates and dam-
ages other individuum’s body.  
c) Compassion is an unusual state, where someone perceives the 
suffering in another one and lessens it, even at his own cost. In 
Schopenhauerian jargon, selfishness and malice are the expression of 
the “affirmation of the Will”, whereas compassion is generally in the 
spirit of the “Will denial” (section 5). As discussed below, egoism and 
malice are the usual states in Temporal justice, whereas compassion 
and asceticism are instead in the domain of the Eternal Justice. 
The lack of individual freedom and the assertion that all human 
actions proceed with necessity from a combination of their motives and 
their character, are foundations of the so-called ontological pessimism in 
Schopenhauer. However, contemporary analysis of behavior emphasizes 
the high tendency to cooperativeness in humans (Vlerick, 2020). In our 
model of psychoeducation and psychotherapy, cooperation is a way to 
redirect self-centered motives (Baptista, 2016; see section on reciprocal 
altruism below). 
Schopenhauer employed the term temporal when referring to daily 
life affairs immersed in the time-space-causality dimensions (the world 
as Representation), whereas Eternal denotes to the world as Will, which 
is out of the spatial-temporal and causal dimensions. 
4. Law and justice in the world as representation: Temporal 
justice 
Schopenhauer’s complex reflections about law and justice are rela-
tively dispersed in several of his texts. Hence, for the sake of clarity and 
brevity, we present a narrative description of his model of the two sides 
of justice (temporal and eternal) which correspond to his core thought of 
the World as Will and Representation (Schopenhauer, 2010a). 
Since the world at the phenomenal -representational- level is based 
on the affirmation of the Will-to-live and its inherent self-centeredness, 
Schopenhauer asserts that it is basically an amoral world, where the 
default prevailing ethics is that so well described by Thomas Hobbes in 
Leviathan as bellum omnium contra omnes (war of all against all) (Scho-
penhauer, 2010a). 
Self-affirmation often requires the assault of other individuals, as it is 
clearly visible in the alimentary chain involving, minerals, plants, and 
fellow animals, but also in numerous human and social interactions. In 
Schopenhauer’s words: “Every grade of the objectification of will fights 
for the matter, the space, and the time of the others” (Schopenhauer, 
2010a). For most of us, that is the normal, socially accepted, egoistic 
way of living, such as the strife for possessions, control over others, 
imposition of our own’s opinion, jealousy, etc. However, in the extreme, 
self-centeredness shows as malice, lying torture, robbery, treason, 
murder, cunningness, and many others (Schopenhauer, 2010a). 
In Schopenhauer’s thought, as for most of the comprehensive models 
of the mind such as psychoanalysis, it is the intellect which paves the 
way for a socially acceptable expression of self-affirmation. According to 
Robert Cloninger (2004), this requires a subtle balance between 
self-directedness and cooperativeness: both dimensions may be 
enhanced or inhibited. A strong tendency towards the extremes would 
thus lead to exaggerated self-affirmation or self-denial, respectively. 
This last is also promoted by passivity, guilt, and remorse. 
The authors think that, given the diversity of mental disorders, mood 
and cognition fluctuations, short-vs. long-term consequences, and 
impact on people, no single model of self-affirmation/denial is expected. 
For example, decreased self-affirmation is observed in subjects with 
neurodevelopmental disorders, depression, bipolar disorder, schizo-
phrenia, and other psychotic disorders (Garcia et al., 2013; Robson 
8 This radical comment must be interpreted within the context of Scho-
penhauer’s thought as the small effect that education and learning have on the 
primeval Will (intelligible character), as stated by the philosopher as follows: 
that is why he cannot decide to be such and such, and cannot become someone 
different; rather he is, once and for all (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 55, on p. 319). 
However, the unchangeable Will may be redirected, and behavior changed by a 
novel motive; that is the acquired character (Schopenhauer, 2010a). This is the 
core for individual salvation according to Schopenhauer. 
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et al., 2020), and rather strong self-affirmation in anxiety-, 
attention-deficit and hyperactivity disorders, eating disorders, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Robson et al., 2020). Relatives and 
caretakers may feel exploited -that is a threat to their self-affirmation-, 
by patients with dementia, some personality- and 
obsessive-compulsive disorders, but it is an underexplored issue 
(Freckelton, 2020). 
A sometimes subtle, but often visible transition occurs from the 
default or natural egoism to malice: the evil subject intentionally and 
purposefully hurts and causes unnecessary pain to another human. As 
described above, Schopenhauer conceived individual differences in the 
propensity to display malice, depending on the excitability of the indi-
vidual Will. 
Contemporary forensic psychiatry does not base legal responsibility 
on the metaphysical Will, which is the foundation of the Schopenhauer’s 
concept of the intelligible character (Felthous, 2008; Luthe & Rosier, 
2004; Meynen, 2010), but rather in a related way to what Schopenhauer 
called the “intellectual freedom of the Will” (Schopenhauer, 2010b), 
which is close to the current medical model (Mason, 2006). 
The “intellectual freedom of the Will” refers in present-day to the set 
of processes through which conscious brain-related mechanisms channel 
human motivations (the individual Will) according to socially dictated 
norms. This is the foundation of the Schopenhauer’s concept of the ac-
quired character, which would be formed by the interaction between the 
individual organism and his environment. We have discussed elsewhere 
(Baptista & Aldana, 2018) how this idea approaches the ontological 
dependence supported by Varela et al. (1991) and Maturana (1988). 
Schopenhauer acknowledged that the intellectual mechanisms that 
regulate the individual’s Will may be impaired at diverse degrees of 
intensity by mental disorders and chemicals (Schopenhauer, 2010a, §
36; Schopenhauer, 1909, § 32). In this way, the philosopher approaches 
contemporary principles and practices concerning criminal re-
sponsibility and the fairness principle of moral proportionality in guilt 
and punishment. This refers to the important notion that the severity of 
punishment must be proportionate to the gravity of the defendant’s 
criminal conduct (Felthous, 2008; von Hirsch, 1992). 
Marcin (2020) stated that since altruism, the potential cure for the 
all-prevalent egoism, can neither be expected nor legislated, and virtues 
cannot be taught, it is then the role of the State to impose rules and 
regulations to prevent possible ill-natured actions of a person against his 
peers. Similarly, Marcin (1994, 2020) believes that Schopenhauer’s 
theory of law is practical, pragmatic and behaviorist in tone, because the 
deeds, and not the intentions are what can be legislated in the world as 
Representation. 
What the law optimally intends is to prevent malicious actions, and 
punishing offenders is often part of the ‘preventive’ strategies. Scho-
penhauer supported this legal spirit in Seneca’s Laws: “No wise man 
punishes because a wrong has been done, but rather in order that it 
should not be done” (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 62 on page 376)..9 
This is the imperfect Temporal Justice in Schopenhauer’s thought, and 
is the foundation of his existential pessimism. However, the philosopher 
stated that “When the state fully achieves its goal, it will present the 
same appearance that would be expected if perfect justice governed 
everybody’s disposition” (Schopenhauer, 2010a; § 62 on page 372). 
This somehow contradictory assertion, given the philosopher’s 
pessimism at the social level, was solved by understanding what hap-
pens when egoism goes from the particular (individual) to the general 
(collective): 
As we have said, the state is so far from being directed against egoism in 
general and as such, that the reverse is in fact true: the state emerges out of 
a cumulative, collective egoism that is fully aware of itself as such and 
proceeds methodically from a one-sided standpoint to that of the uni-
versal. The state is set up under the correct assumption that pure morality, 
i.e., morally grounded rightful action, cannot be expected; otherwise, of 
course, the state itself would be quite superfluous (Schopenhauer, 
2010a; § 62 on page 372). 
Temporal Justice is thus, the way the State may manage at the 
behavioral level the omnipresent and collective egoism. At this 
phenomenal level, the State can only prevent wrong actions which 
constitute the original and positive concepts: “the counter-concept right 
is negative and derivative” (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 62 on page 365). 
Schopenhauer’s theory of law, thereby, only addresses the damaging 
aspects of the exercises of the Will-to-live at the individual level. How-
ever, according to the philosopher, affirming and advancing “the com-
mon egoism of all” somehow results in societal well-being (Marcin, 
1994). 
But the exertion of Law as it is, and Temporal Justice, are unsatis-
factory in an ontological sense, because they do not address the cause of 
the conflicting exercise of the Will-to-live. Schopenhauer addressed this 
conflict at the ontological level, with the notion of Eternal Justice. 
5. Law and justice in the world as Will: Eternal justice 
When Schopenhauer turned from Temporal-to Eternal Justice, he 
also diverged from the standard, Western philosophical style with which 
he explored the Law in the world as representation, in favor of a 
metaphysical style to approach Justice in the world as Will (Marcin, 
2020). Besides, Schopenhauer only addressed the individually damaging 
(self-centered) side of the exercise of the Will-to-live in the world as 
Representation, but here, he turned to a collectively, rather positive 
side. 
Eternal Justice may be understood either at a highly rational/con-
ceptual level or may be metaphysically and emotionally experienced. 
Concerning the former, Schopenhauer conceived all phenomena 
(organic or inorganic) as temporary fragments of an eternal and indi-
visible primeval Will. Thus, any action directed from a phenomenon to 
another one is eventually assimilated and balanced in the pre- 
individualized Will; hence, there are not net gains or losses. When 
conceived and expressed this way, there is an Eternal state of fairness in 
the primeval Will. 
In the metaphysical realm, the Eternal Justice refers to the realiza-
tion, or the achievement of a special knowledge: the aggressor and the 
victim are distinct as phenomena, but both are part of the same unit or 
essence, which is the Will.10 Hence, at the level of the primeval Will, the 
victim is as guilty as the aggressor and vice versa. After this realization, 
the illuminated subject clearly perceives the unity of all creatures and 
suddenly, it may appear the only free act of the individual subject, which 
is the denial of the Will. The Will’s denial expresses as compassion to-
ward all beings and renunciation or asceticism, and, according to Scho-
penhauer, it is radically different from suicide, which rather derives 
from a strong attachment to the Will-to-live. 
Schopenhauer provided a rich description of the path for under-
standing Eternal Justice. The term “path” must be cautiously used, 
because concerning the atemporal and un-spatial Will, an ordered 
sequence is not conceivable. Thomas Mann described this path as three 
existential dimensions: aesthetical, ethical, and metaphysical (Quoted 
by Ivars, 1976). It is an experience that inherently occurs in human 
beings, as follows: 
9 Schopenhauer’s endorsement of Seneca may be considered as a philo-
sophical precursor of current proposals of alternative methods to mass incar-
ceration, such as restorative justice, community services and many others 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007). 
10 Alternative methods to mass incarceration such as communitarian activity 
may be a non-metaphysical bridge between temporal and eternal justice (see 
footnote 9). 
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1) Aesthetical: It implies the maximal dissociation between willing 
and knowing. In a rather sudden experience, one becomes a subject of 
pure perception, who perceives an object in a Will-less state. Aesthetic 
contemplation is a prime but not exclusive example of such a state. The 
artist, or any human being, may suddenly and briefly perceive the Pla-
tonic Ideas behind phenomena. This placates the insatiable Will (Scho-
penhauer, 1909, § 30). 
2) Ethical: It refers to the perfect realization of the unity of all phe-
nomena, living and non-living, the striving that life imposes over them, 
and the existential liberation from the principium individuationis.11 
Echoing Hindu mythology, Schopenhauer described this a raising the 
“Veil of Maya”, and portrayed it as follows: 
The essence of this work has finally come to us in the Upanishads, which 
are the greatest gift of this century; it is expressed in many forms, but 
particularly when all the beings of the world, living and lifeless, are led in 
succession past the gaze of the disciples, while a certain word is pro-
nounced over each of them, a word that has become a formula and as 
such is called ‘Mahavakya Tatoumes’, or more correctly ‘tat tvam asi’, 
which means: ‘You are that’ (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 63 on page 382). 
3) Metaphysical: It is the Will’s denial. This is perhaps one of the most 
original expressions in Schopenhauer’s thought. Under the umbrella of 
the aesthetical and ethical experiences, the subject feels an imperious 
desire of renunciation and asceticism, and in a calm and joyful mood 
turns compassionately towards all other creatures. The philosopher 
stated this as follows: 
… when we see through the principium individuationis, we immediately 
recognize the Ideas, indeed the essence of things in themselves, as being in 
everything the same will, and from this cognition comes a universal 
tranquillizer of willing; individual motives become ineffective, because the 
mode of cognition that corresponds to them retreats, obscured by an 
entirely different mode of cognition (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 70, on 
page 430). 
By eradicating the distinction between one’s own individual and that 
of others, this is the only thing that makes possible and explains perfect 
dispositional goodness that goes as far as the most disinterested love and the 
most generous self-sacrifice for the sake of others (Schopenhauer, 2010a, 
§ 68, on page 405). 
Schopenhauer stated that the road to, and the circumstances that 
surround the rare individua that follow this path are various, but 
frequently involve the own suffering or witnessing that of others. 
Schopenhauer’s scholars are delineating the personality profile of the 
subjects who display compassion along their life (Ribeiro, 2016). 
Compassion-prone people may be suitable for communitarian activities. 
This is relevant for the development of personalized alternative methods 
to mass incarceration. 
The philosopher also declared that such an experience, which is the 
maximal expression of the freedom of the Will: 
“… is that what the Christian mystics call the effect of divine grace and 
being born again” (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 70, on page 431). 
In a set of celebrated paragraphs concerning the Will denial, Scho-
penhauer emphasized several relevant issues: the originality of his 
proposal, its universality, the insistence in deeds rather than in in-
tentions, and the independence of abstract cognition, specific religion, 
and beliefs in God: 
This might be the first time that the inner nature of holiness, self-denial, 
asceticism, and the mortification of one’s own will has been expressed 
abstractly, cleansed of all mythology, as the negation of the will to life … 
all of those saints and ascetics have recognized it directly and expressed it 
through deeds; although they have the same inner recognition, they 
articulate it in very different ways, according to the dogma each has 
rationally accepted. This leads Indian, Christian and Lamaist saints to 
account for their own deeds in very different ways, but this does not 
matter in the least. A saint can be full of the most absurd superstitions, or 
conversely, he can be a philosopher: it makes no difference. Only his deeds 
confirm him to be a saint: because morally, his deeds do not come from 
abstract cognition, but from an intuitively grasped, direct cognition of the 
world and its essence, and he filters this through some dogma only to 
satisfy his reason … Naturally, we will not encounter these in everyday 
experience: … You also see how little it matters whether it comes from a 
theistic or atheistic religion” (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 68, on p. 
410–411). 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Critical summary of Schopenhauer’s thought on law and justice 
For Schopenhauer in daily life, that is in the world as Representation, 
there are no individual freedoms, true morality, or ethics; there is only 
Temporal Justice. It is a world of relative fairness, since the State orga-
nizes citizens to ideally prevent, but very often to punish for mischievous 
deeds, within the spirit of a collective self-centeredness. That is the basis 
for his ontological pessimism. Concerning, self-centeredness, which if a 
core topic in Schopenhauer’s psychology, a more positive evaluation of 
egoism, defined as ‘rational self-interest’ was stimulated in the 20th 
century by the work of Ayn Rand (Arrigo, 2002; Baptista et al., 2018). 
R.B Marcin stated that “Schopenhauer is one with the legal econo-
mists and public-choice theorists who inhabit today’s law-and- 
economics movement, [whose] theory of law should be behaviorist, … 
[and] sometimes see the human being as nothing more or less than an 
egoistic, rational, utility maximizer” (Marcin, 2020, on p. 313–322). 
While the psychiatry forensic field abandoned the issue of a “meta-
physical free will”, an “intellectual free will” is in the core of the con-
cepts of mens rea (the intention or knowledge of wrongdoing) and actus 
reus (action or conduct which is a constituent element of a crime). This is 
referred as the intention-action-effect chain. What judges evaluate is the 
accused’s capacity to act in accordance with his or her intentions. The 
accused’s narrative on his or her agency is then normatively evaluated: 
that is, the narrative is confronted to current common beliefs and values. 
The bridges among intention-action-explanation of behavior are not 
optimally delineated by contemporary neuroscience (Bigenwald & 
Chambon, 2019). Besides, mental disorders are notoriously heteroge-
neous, and the issue of simultaneous substance abuse adds further 
complexity (Matcheswalla & De Sousa, 2015) (see the Conclusion sec-
tion for further discussion). 
In the world as Will, specifically after the Will’s denial, which is, 
according to Schopenhauer, the only place where the freedom of the 
Will manifests itself directly (Schopenhauer, 2010a, § 68, on p. 422),12 
suddenly the Eternal Justice appears. From now on, while maintaining 
his physical and mental individuality, the subject profoundly perceives 
11 The principium individuationis (Individuation Principle) refers to the 
perception of individual things (living and non-livings) departing from a uni-
tary Will. For Schopenhauer, the principle in question is that things are 
distinguished from one another by their position in space and time (Scho-
penhauer, 2010a, Introduction, on page XXV). 
12 Why this is the only free act of the Will is a complex issue in Schopenhauer’s 
thought. It starts in his statement that in the world as representation the Will 
“trying to increase well-being in one of its appearances, produces vast amounts 
of suffering in another, and so, …it sinks its teeth into its own flesh … (Scho-
penhauer, 2010a, §63, in p.381). According to Lopez de SantaMaría (2020, on 
p. 202), once the subject reaches the knowledge of the unity of all creatures, 
“the Will itself frees itself from its own contradictions, arriving at its own 
self-denial”. How the Will-denial relates to mental illness and criminality re-
mains underexplored. 
T. Baptista et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Forensic Science International: Mind and Law 2 (2021) 100065
8
the unity of all creatures, deeply inside knows that victim and perpe-
trator are the same, and spontaneously fills his life with compassion and 
asceticism. Concerning contemporary legal systems, Marcin thinks that 
“civic republicans and other communitarians sense [this] noumenal 
[metaphysical] level of eternal reality” [and] “see the human being as an 
entity fully capable of an altruistic cooperative solidarity” (Marcin, 
2020, on p. 322). 
As stated above, with this two-sided theory of justice, Schopenhauer 
“bridges a gap that has long existed between Western and Eastern ap-
proaches to philosophy” (Marcin, 2020, on p. 311). 
Marcin contends that Schopenhauer’s position “may seem somewhat 
superficial to some of us today (Marcin, 2020, on p. 314). Marcin did not 
display the basis for this key criticism. However, we speculate that it is 
related to the lack of confidence that Schopenhauer had on the role of 
communitarian activities in the development of enduring and collective 
well-being. 
In addition, Schopenhauer did not address the potential and actual 
missuses of temporal justice such as despotism, totalitarianism, incar-
ceration of the general population for political reasons, and forced 
treatment in the mentally ill. (Haw et al., 2011).13 Schopenhauer did not 
address either, the relationship between mental illnesses and the Will 
denial in the metaphysical sense. 
The metaphysical bridge (Will-denial, expressed as compassion and 
asceticism) that Schopenhauer set between temporal and eternal justice 
may currently appear unrealistic, as the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk 
(2013, on p. 64) recently affirmed: “It may be that his doctrine of the 
resignation of the Will must sound even stranger to the hunger for life 
among the inhabitants of the First World today than it would have to 
Schopenhauer’s contemporaries”. 
However, recent scientific and psychotherapeutic advances support 
rephrasing the Schopenhauerian claims for compassion and asceticism 
by more operative terms such as cooperation and healthy austerity 
(Baptista, 2016). After discussing some of these advances and their 
relationship to current trends in justice administration, specifically 
alternative methods to mass incarceration, we will end pointing out how 
Schopenhauer thought may shed light in the challenges posed in the 
field of psychiatry and the law. 
Our central message is that novel approaches in crime prevention 
and penalty (in the Schopenhauerian world as Representation, strictly 
dependent on a relative slow chain of space, time, and causality) 
coupled with the instantaneous communication of contemporary infor-
matics (which in a minor measure resembles the world as Will), may 
shorten the bridge between temporal and eternal justice. 
We will discuss two aspects of contemporary science which are 
relevant for the Forensic field: the evolutionary thinking about the key 
issues of altruism and cooperation, and how quantic physics is changing 
world-wide communication. Briefly, the former assumes that in most 
human interactions, some sort of retribution is expected by the involved 
individuals. Accordingly, compassion, conceived as disinterested inter-
action, may be uncommon. The later refers to the impact of almost 
instantaneous transmission of personal data, on crime prevention and 
punishment. 
6.1. Schopenhauer’s thought and contemporary science 
6.1.1. Evolutionary analysis: altruism and cooperation 
In this section we will specifically refer to the scientific approach to 
altruism, as an opposite interpersonal construct to selfishness, which 
constitutes the core of Schopenhauer’s analysis of social interaction. As 
discussed above, Marcin (2020) stated that altruism, the obvious cure 
for the all-prevalent egoism, cannot be neither imposed, nor legislated. 
Altruism refers to the disinterested interest in others’ well-being, even at 
the price of self-sacrifice, and has been scientifically assessed in the field 
of evolutionary psychology (Burkart et al., 2018; Trivers, 1971). 
Three types of altruism have been described under the principles of 
the species’ evolution theory. (Vlerick, 2020).  
1) ‘Kin altruism’ refers to behaviors that increase the evolutionary 
success of genetically related organisms, that is relatives. (Trivers, 
1971; Ridley, 1996; Vlerick, 2020).  
2) ‘Reciprocal altruism’, where the altruistic organism is in fact 
behaving in an ‘enlightened’ self-interested way since it could expect 
the favor to be returned in the future. (Trivers, 1971; Vlerick, 2020). 
This is thus, an equivalent or a close term to ‘cooperation’. 
The scientific study of cooperativeness is an important section of the 
so-called game theory, that conflagrates computer scientists, econo-
mists, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and biologists among 
many other contemporary scientists. Models of cooperative behavior 
have been developed, notably the so-called tit-for-tat, the prisoner’s 
dilemma, the dictator game, and many others (Ridley, 1996).  
3) ‘Rational altruism’: there are numerous instances in which the 
altruist cannot expect reciprocation because the beneficiary is un-
known, too distant, or only amenable for a single encounter. Ac-
cording to Vlerick (2020), this third type of altruism, which is closer 
to the original meaning of the term, reflects the people’ inherent 
cooperative disposition, and it is only seen in humans. 
6.2. Altruism and Schopenhauerian egoism 
Which contemporary definition of altruism is closer to Scho-
penhauer’s concern onto others in both sides of his world: Will and 
Representation? 
Kin- and reciprocal altruism seem to fit with standard definition of 
egoism in the world as Representation since they are aimed at specific 
individua, follow the principle of sufficient reason, and retribution is 
expected, either as increased inclusive fitness or personal retribution. 
‘Rational altruism’ as we called it, does not appear to be as well 
characterized as kin and reciprocal altruism. Its rational foundation 
places it under the principle of sufficient reason, tend to be short-lasting 
and it is less directed towards specific fellows than the kin- and recip-
rocal types. 
Hence, the three types of altruism seem closer to Temporal than to 
Eternal Justice. 
However, the development of Buddhist practice-related psycho-
therapeutic techniques, such as the Compassion-based (Gilbert, 2014) 
and the Mindfulness (Khoury et al., 2013) models, and the concern to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, have raised the interest in the issue of compassion. 
It is out of the scope of this essay to assess its feasibility and relatedness 
to the Schopenhauerian compassion. Hence, in the restricted fields of 
psychology and psychotherapy and for the sake of heuristics and prag-
matism, we paraphrased ‘compassion and asceticism’ as ‘intensive 
cooperation and healthy austerity’ (Baptista, 2016). 
6.3. Contemporary science and eternal justice 
6.3.1. Eternal justice and quantic physics 
In his analysis of the eternal justice R.B. Martin finds a parallel be-
tween the two-dimensional Schopenhauerian world (phenomenal and 
noumenal), and how contemporary physics conceives the world: “a 
Newtonian world at the level of perception in which we are ruled by the 
principle of cause and effect, discreteness, and the arrow of time, and a 
quantum world at the unobservable level of bare existence in which all is 
one and one is all, and one and all are driven by the angst of tendency 
13 Schopenhauer’s little faith in humanity may be misinterpreted as a support 
for totalitarianism, this including delinquents and the mentally ill. That this was 
not the case, the authors believe, is supported by his activism against con-
querors, slavery, and animal abuse, and his claim for compassion and asceticism 
as a path to individual salvation. 
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and probability” (Marcin, 2020, on p.322). Importantly for our discus-
sion, since time, space, and causality are differentially conceptualized 
and/or measured in Newtonian and quantic physics (Fein et al., 2019; 
Zych et al., 2019), we can parsimoniously affirm that concerning the 
spatial-temporal and causality dimensions, the worlds as Will and 
Representation are being currently bridged. 
If, as Schopenhauer claim, Eternal Justice is part of the desirable 
world we would like to inhabit, the contribution of quantic physics to 
this quest is welcome (Marcin, 2020). 
Quantic physics is radically changing human communication dy-
namics: speed, storage of information, detection of individual features 
and individual location, the probable transmission of sensory informa-
tion besides visual and auditive such as touch, smell and taste, artificial 
transmission of thoughts and emotions, and many others (Moses et al., 
2021). Collectively, these technical advances will surely improve the 
efficiency of Temporal Justice, for example for fast biometric criminals’ 
identification, detection, and follow-up (Kloosterman et al., 2015). This 
appears particularly suitable for alternative methods of punishment and 
crime prevention, such as communitarian tasks. 
How might these advances promote Eternal Justice, or alternatively, 
how may they improve the bridge between Temporal and Eternal Jus-
tice? The growing communication efficiency will increase interpersonal 
interaction greatly. Consequently, it might increase the awareness on 
the intimacy of our fellows and promote compassion, under the um-
brella of a universal conscience. But malice may increase as well, for 
example in political prosecution and identity theft among many others 
(Burnes et al., 2020; Dadkhah et al., 2018). 
In any case, it might be speculated that the phenomenal and the 
noumenal worlds are getting closer. This might create a new dynamic 
where the phenomenal world would be more metaphysical (more 
quantic) and vice versa. 
7. Conclusions and the relationship between Schopenhauer and 
contemporary forensic psychiatry 
The contemporary field of forensic psychiatry faces several chal-
lenges. Firstly, there is an ongoing search for alternative methods of 
crime prevention and punishment (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, 2007). Moreover, there is a need to counteract the fact that the 
mentally ill are arrested, convicted, and sent to prison in proportions 
that surpass their actual criminal behavior (Matcheswalla & De Sousa, 
2015). 
The discount of some mental disorders as legal defense also repre-
sents an ongoing issue: antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), is the 
most common diagnosis in prisoners (Ghiasi et al., 2021; Matcheswalla 
& De Sousa, 2015). Concern exists that other mental illnesses which are 
often underperceived, such as the obsessive-compulsive spectrum, may 
further impair the intellectual free will, and would be not fairly inter-
preted by juries (Freckelton, 2020). Further, contemporary neurosci-
ence, despite its impressive conceptual and technological advances, 
waits for further refinements to better assist the issue of criminal re-
sponsibility (Bigenwald & Chambon, 2019). 
Psychiatric diagnosis is also under profound revision. Dimensional 
diagnosis such as the model of the Research Domain Criteria (Cuthbert & 
Insel, 2013) may soon substitute categorical diagnosis such as those in 
the standard criteria of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-V) 
and World Health Organization (ICD-11). Dimensional diagnosis might 
make better use of neuroscience techniques to assist the Law system in 
crime prevention, punishment, follow up and rehabilitation. For 
example, the psychiatric assessment may switch from discrete categor-
ical diagnosis such as schizophrenia, to levels of impulsivity, anxiety, 
dissociation, seizure propensity and many other transdiagnostic di-
mensions, which perhaps offer a more reliable evaluation of delinquent 
behavior risk and rehabilitation than clinical diagnosis. This of course is 
an active field of research, whose results are eagerly expected (Curthbert 
& Insel, 2013). Some of those Research Domains such as the 
Arousal/Regulatory and Sensory-Motor Systems are assessed by pro-
cedures that barely involve conceptual activity and thus are relatively 
closer to the primeval Schopenhauerian’s Wil than most psychiatric 
constructs used in forensic psychiatry. 
As regards as the application of Schopenhauer’s thought to forensic 
psychiatry, contemporary justice systems arguably fit well with Tem-
poral Justice as defined by the philosopher. However, the present-day 
reflexive mind is permanently stunned by the contradictions between 
Law, Morality, Ethics and Justice, which usually involve selfish acts, as 
defined by the philosopher. A straightforward example is a Legal but 
Amoral act and vice versa. 
Schopenhauer provided a solution in the Will-denial and entitled it 
as Eternal Justice, which is metaphysically free from the above- 
mentioned contradictions. For the standard contemporary citizen, at 
least in Western countries, who supports his expectations and deeds with 
scientific information, Eternal Justice provides little comfort. This of 
course may not be the case for those with religious/theistic beliefs. 
A central issue in the Eternal Justice construct is the realization of the 
unity of all creatures and the development of compassion. Advances in 
quantum physics, informatics, and neuroscience, by allowing instanta-
neous transference of individualized information may promote 
compassion in crime prevention and rehabilitation, for example, by 
practicing vivid imagery scenarios where cooperation instead of malice 
are prompted (Sygel & Wallinius, 2021). 
In the restricted scenery of applied psychology and personal 
improvement in which the authors work, the Schopenhauerian notions 
of compassion and asceticism have been rephrased as intensive cooperation 
and healthy austerity (Baptista, 2016; Baptista et al., 2018). These re-
statements are one with the spirit of Buddhists and mindfulness practices 
(Gilbert, 2014; Khoury et al., 2013) and surely with many psycho-
educational and personal growth programs. 
Any contemporary project aimed at evaluating or applying Scho-
penhauer’s reflections on individual or collective affairs, must consider 
the profound discussion and criticisms to Schopenhauer’s work, 
particularly, but not only, by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). His 
objections to Schopenhauer’s thought extend to several areas of the 
philosopher’s work. However, those related to the issue or compassion, 
are particularly relevant for the present essay. Tom Stern (2020), for 
example, discussed the Nietzsche’s objections to Schopenhauer’s 
compassion in four areas: psychological, historical, that related to the 
value of life and the last on the nature of pleasure and pain. 
We believe that despite the difficulties of applying abstract philo-
sophical writings in a heuristic and holistic way, Schopenhauer’s 
thought, because of his deep insights on human nature, may constitute 
part of the philosophical foundations of contemporary forensic 
psychiatry. 
To conclude with a coda, concerning Eternal Justice, Raymond B. 
Marcin stated that: 
We must at necessity function at the level of phenomena … But there are 
occasional breakthroughs. And, at times, the breeze of the Platonic idea 
sweeps the veil aside momentarily and we get a glimpse of the unity of 
subject and object in aesthetics. And, at times, in our relations with one 
another, we have another glimpse at the deep level of true reality” 
(Marcin, 220, on p. 318). 
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Garcia, D., Anckarsäter, H., & Lundström, S. (2013). Self-directedness and 
cooperativeness, psychosocial dysfunction and suffering in ESSENCE. The Scientific 
World Journal. https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/416981. Article ID 416981. 
Gerlach, M., Farb, B., Revelle, W., & Nunes Amaral, L. A. (2018). A robust data-driven 
approach identifies four personality types across four large data sets. Nature Human 
Behavior, 2, 735–742. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0419-z 
Ghiasi, N., Azhar, Y., & Singh, J. Psychiatric illness and criminality. [Updated 2021 Apr 
30]. In: StatPearls [Internet]. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing; 2021 Jan-. 
Available from:: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK537064/. 
Gilbert, P. (2014). The origins and nature of compassion focused therapy. British Journal 
of Clinical Psychology, 53, 6–41. 
Golomb, J. (2020). The inscrutable riddle of Schopenhauer’s relations to Jews and to 
Judaism. In R. L. Wicks (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Schopenhauer (chap. 25). NY: 
Oxford University Press, USA.  
Haw, C., Stubbs, J., Bickle, A., & Steward, A. (2011). Coercive treatments in forensic 
psychiatry: A study of patients’ experiences and preferences. Journal of Forensic 
Psychiatry and Psychology, 22, 564–585. 
Hepp, K. (2020). Space, time, categories, mechanics, and consciousness: On Kant and 
Neuroscience. Journal of Statistical Physics, 180, 896–909. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 
s10955-020-02551-x 
von Hirsch, A. (1992). Proportionality in the philosophy of punishment. Crime and 
Justice, 16, 55–98. 
Houellebecq, M. (1998). The elementary particles. New York: Knopf.  
Houellebecq, M. (2005). The possibility of an island. New York: Knopf.  
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